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DIRECT ACTIONS AGAINST INSURANCE
COMPANIES
0. J.

RUDSER*

It will be assumed in this article that the casualty policies
involved have incorporated in them a "no action" clause which
prohibits either a direct suit against or a joinder of the defendant's
insurance company as a direct defendant until judgment first has
been obtained against the insured.' Not included are actions brought
against insurers after the provisions of such "no action" clauses
have been satisfied or suits brought on these policies that are
required under Interstate Commerce Commission regulations or
motor carrier transportation provisions of a particular state or city.
The scope of this article will be limited to a discussion of those
cases brought in states where there are no direct action statutes
wherein the insurance company is named as a direct defendant,
predicated upon liability arising out of a statute in a direct action
state, where the insurer is the real party in interest and thus suable
directly or where the insurer (although not named as a direct
defendant) has been subjected to an in rem proceeding based upon
the jurisdiction in rem obtained by the attachment of the insurance
policy in that particular state.
The majority rule is that the defendant's insurer cannot be
directly sued by the plaintiff. Besides prohibition by statute, other
reasons have been given-that of public policy,2 prohibition
by judicial decision,2 lack of privity between the injured person
*
LL.B. 1933, University of Minnesota, Order of the Colf, 1933; Claim Legal Manager,
Employers Insurance of Wausau, Wausau, Wisconsin.
1. A standard no action clause in most present combination casualty policies reads as
follows : No action shall lie against the company unless, as a precedent thereto, there shall
have been full compliance with all of the terms of this policy, nor until the amount of the
Insured's obligation to pay shall have been finally determined either by judgment against
the insured after actual trial or by written agreement of the Insured, the claimant and the
company.
Any person or organization or the legal representative thereof who has secured such
judgment or written agreement shall thereafter be entitled to recover under this policy to
the extent of the insurance afforded by this policy. No person or organization shall have
any right under this policy to join the company as a party to any action against the insured to determine the insured's liability, nor shall the company be impleaded by the insured or his legal representative. Bankruptcy or insolvenay of the insured or of the inisured's estate shall not relieve the company of any of Its obligations hereunder.
2. Marchlik v. Coronet Insurance Co. 40 I1.2d 327, 239 N.E.2d 799 (1968).
3. See Marchlik v. Coronet Insurance Co. 40 Ill.2d 327, 239 N.E.2d 799 (1968).
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and the insurer,4 misjoinder of an action in tort with an action on
the contract, and the enforcement of the "no action" clause in
the policy.5 Many of these same reasons are given for forbidding
disclosure to the jury of the fact that the defendant is insured. The
feeling is that such information will be prejudicial to the defendant
in that it will increase the size of the verdict.
There are, however, several exceptions to the majority rule,
the most obvious being where such actions have been successfully
brought in one state by reason of a direct action statute of another
state. States having direct action statutes are Wisconsin, 6 Louisiana, 7 and Rhode Island." There is a similar statute in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 9 A second exception occurs where a
court, without benefit of any statute, holds that since the insurer
was the real party in interest it could, therefore, be sued directly
together with the joinder of the named insured as a party defendant. A third exception is where the insurance carrier's policy
is considered a debt or an obligation, is attached as such, and
jurisdiction in rem is obtained over the defendant insured. Here,
however, the insurer is not a named defendant, but one of the provisions common to direct action statutes is present-that being that
even though the insured appeared and defended in personam the
recovery is limited to the policy limits. 10 Furthermore, by this
procedure the action may be brought in any state-if said state permits the attachment of intangibles-where the insurer is doing business regardless of where the accident happened- or where the policy
was issued.
Pursuant to Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corporation," a state can constitutionally provide for a direct action
against the insurer where the accident occurs in that state regardless of where the policy was issued. Justice Black stated:
What we have already said disposes of the contention
that Louisiana's law compelling foreign insurance companies to consent to direct actions is unconstitutional. That
contention is that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids a state to compel a foreign corporation
to surrender constitutional rights as a condition of being
permitted to do business in the state [citing case]. That
4. ,see Torcazo v. Statema 141 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. Ill. 1956) ; U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty
(1913).
v. Maryland Casualty Co. 182 Ill. Tpp. 438 -N.E.5. Shermoen v. Lindsay 163 N.W.2d 738 (N.D., 1968) ; Marchlik v. Coronet Insurance
Co. 40
l.2d -, 239 N.E.2d 799 (1968).
6.
WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 204.301(4) and 260-.11(1) (1967 Supp.).
7. L.A. REV. STAT. 22:655 (1962 Supp.)
8. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN., 27-7-(1).
9. LAWS OF PUERTO Rico, Tit. 26 §§ 2001, 2003, (1966).
10. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 290. N.Y.S.2d 914, 238 N.E.2d 319 (1968).
11. 348 U.S. 66 (1954), rehearing denied 348 U.S. 921 (1955).
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principle is inapplicable to this case because, as we have
just decided, Louisiana has a constitutional right to subject
foreign liability insurance companies to the direct action
provisions of its laws whether they consent or not.' 2
A reading of the direct action statutes indicates the conditions
which must be met before the suit can be started in that particular
jurisdiction, and no problems are presented by most of the statutes.
The procedures necessary to be followed to start a suit under a
particular state's direct action statute will not be discussed. The
article will be confined to the attempts made to give extraterritorial
effect to such statutes and how these direct action statutes have
been construed to permit or disallow actions in other states. Although the statutes, in the main, are similar, there are differences
so that each will be separately discussed.
By its terms, the Wisconsin statute 3 limits the actions to those
involving damages caused .by the negligent operation, maintenance,
management, or control of a motor vehicle. It provides that the
action be brought in Wisconsin, and if the policy of insurance
was issued or delivered outside the state of Wisconsin, the insurer
shall be made a direct defendant only if the accident or injury
occurred in the state of Wisconsin. One commentator has suggested that since the direct action statute of Wisconsin gives substantive rights, those rights should be enforceable in any state where

12. 348 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1954).
13. The pertinent parts are Wis. STATS. §§ 204.30(4) and 260.11(1)
204.30(4) reads as follows:

(1967

Supp.).

Any bond or policy of insurance covering liability to others by reason of
the operation of a motor vehicle shall be deemed and construed to contain the
following conditions: That the insurer shall be liable to the persons entitled
to recover for the death of any person, or for injury to person or property,
irrespective of whether such liability be in praesenti or contingent and to become fixed or certain by final judgment against the insured, when caused by
the negligent operation, management, control, maintenance, use or defective
construction of the vehicle described therein, such liabilitby not to exceed the
amount named in said bond or policy.
Section 260.11(1) reads in part, Any person may be made a defendant
who has or claims an interest in the dontroversy adverse to the plaintiff, or
who is a necessary party to a complete determination or settlement of the
questions involved therein. . . . In any action for damages caused by the negligent operation, management, control, maintenance, use or defective construiction of a motor vehicle, any insurer of motor vehicles, which has an Interest in the outcome of such controversy adverse to the plaintiff or any of the
parties to such controversy, or which by its policy of insurance assumes or
reserves the right to control the prosecution,. defense or settlement of the
claim or action of the plaintiff or any of the parties to such claim or action,
or which by its policy agrees to prosecute or defend the action brought by the
plaintiff or any of the parties to such action, or. agrees to engage counsel to
prosecute or defend said action, or agrees to pay the costs of such litigation,
is by this section made a proper party defendant in any action brought by the
plaintiff in this state on account of any claim against the insured. If the
policy of insurance was issued or delivered outside the state of Wisconsin,
the insurer is by this section made a proper party defendant only if the accident or injury occurred in the state of Wisqonsin,

§
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jurisdiction over the insurer can be secured, and the only bar
should be the public policy of the state of the forum.14
The public policy bar is one of the principal defenses urged
by the defendant insurer when sued directly in another state. Attempts to give extraterritorial effect to this statute have been made
in federal courts sitting in Illinois, a state court in Michigan, the
state court in Minnesota-notwithstanding the provision of the
statute which provides "in any action brought by the plaintiff in
this state." The federal district courts in Illinois and the state
courts are in direct conflict as respects the enforcement of the
Wisconsin statute in that state. However, the federal district court
cases were decided before the Supreme Court of Illinois in Marchlik v. Coronet Insurance Company15 held that such an action was
against public policy. Therefore, it would be expected that hereafter the federal court will apply the law of Illinois, including its
conflict of laws rules in future cases, and thus foreclose future
direct actions against insurers in that state.
In Torcazo v. Statema,16 the plaintiff, a resident of Illinois,
sued Statema, a Wisconsin resident, and joined Statema's insurer
as a party defendant in an action in United States district court
in Illinois for injuries received in an accident in Wisconsin. The
policy had been issued in Wisconsin and suit was based upon the
Wisconsin statute. The defendant insurer's motion to dismiss was
denied. The court pointed out that there was no express statutory
prohibition in Illinois as respects the joinder of the insurance carrier.
Nonetheless, it did indicate that Illinois prohibited reference to
insurance during the trial of an action, and in addition, that Illinois
had held that direct actions were not allowed because of lack of
privity between the injured person and the insurance carrier.
However, the court said:
The court is of the opinion that 85.93 of the Wisconsin
statute1 7 creates a right of action against a Wisconsin insurer under the policy issued by it in Wisconsin in favor
of the injured person for whose benefit such an insurance
contract was made. Being a substantive right, the court
holds that the joinder of the insurance carrier in this suit
is proper and the motion to dismiss must be overruled. 8
In Posner v. Travelers Insurance Co., 19 the plaintiff, a resident
14.
612.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

MacDonald, Direct Action Against IMabiity Insurance Companies, 1957 Wis. L REv.
Supra note 2.
141 F.Supp. 769 (N.D. Ill.
1956).
Now Wis. STAT. § 204.30(4).
Supra note 17 at 773.
244 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. Ii. 1965).
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of Illinois, was in an automobile accident in Wisconsin with a
resident of Michigan. The policy was issued and delivered in Michigan and contained a "no action clause." A suit naming the insurer
as a defendant again was in the federal district court in Illinois
but predicated upon the Wisconsin direct action statute. Plaintiff's motion to vacate the previous order of dismissal was granted
and the cause reinstated, the court holding that the Wisconsin
statute was substantive. The court further held that the venue
provision "in this state" was not binding on the court since the
action was transitory, and, further, the action was not against public
policy because of the mere fact that there was a difference between
the Illinois law and the applicable foreign law. Such a difference, the
court noted, will not of itself create a public policy barrier to the
enforcement of the foreign law.
The latest case in federal district court in Illinois, Swanson
v. Badger Mutual Insurance Company,'20 an accident in Wisconsin
where the plaintiff, a passenger in an automobile from Illinois, was
injured when he was struck by an automobile which then came in
contact with a crane alongside the road. The plaintiff, a resident
of Illinois, sued directly the insurer of the automobile and the insurer
of the crane relying on the Wisconsin direct action statute. The
insurer's motions to dismiss were denied, the court holding that
the Wisconsin law applied since it had the most contacts with the
parties. The court noted that the law of the forum decides whether
a law is substantive or procedural and held that the Wisconsin law
was substantive and therefore applicable. The court further held
that the crane insurer's contention that the crane was not a "motor
vehicle" and thus not within the scope of the direct action statute
was not a question which could be decided on motion.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, however, recently refused to
give extraterritorial effect to the Wisconsin statute in Marchlik v.
Coronet Insurance Company.21 The plaintiff, a resident of Wisconsin,
was injured in a two-car automobile accident in that state but
brought action in Illinois against the liability carriers for the two
drivers under the Wisconsin direct action statute. Each policy had
been issued in Illinois and contained nearly identical "no action"
clauses. Neither party had raised the issue of forum non conveniens.
The court pointed out that Wisconsin itself had considered its direct
action statute to be substantive and held that it too would find
that the statute was substantive and entitled to comity provided
there was no compelling public policy of the state to the contrary
respecting the direct joinder of the insurance carriers. The court,
20.
21.

275 F.Supp. 544 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
40 I11.2d 327, 239 N.E.2d 799 (1968).
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however, found such compelling public policy from an interpretation of its statutory law. Although there was no statute prohibiting
such action, the statutory section on impleaders specifically provided that it did not create a substantive right against an insurer,
and the insurance law itself provided for actions against the insurer upon insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured and return of
the execution unsatisfied. Thus both statutes indicated a legislative
policy opposing actions against insurers before judgment. The
court further pointed out that "direct action" clauses in policies in
the state were judicially recognized. The differences between the
two states' laws and procedures and the probably resultant confusion should direct actions be permitted were stressed when the
court said:
Foreign substantive law is not, of course, unenforceable
as being contrary to public policy just because it differs
from our own law, but the differences here are such as to
be against our public policy. Our Courts and juries would
be hard put to cope with the complex problems posed by
other aspects of Wisconsin Law if these direct actions
are permitted. Wisconsin's lack of a guest statute such as
we have, and its interpretation of policy language, would result in confusion and possibly injustice. If this case is
entertained by our Courts, many more will follow with their
attendant appeals. Eventually two bodies of law would be
other
built up, one relating to domestic cases and the
22
based on our interpretation of the Wisconsin Law.
The fact that Wisconsin did not have a guest statute but that
Illinois did hardly seems a valid reason for declining to take jurisdiction since many times courts are compelled to interpret the laws
of other states under the lex loci dellecti principle where such laws
differ from their own. The court indicated that the lower courts
of the state had reached the same conclusion respecting the public
23
policy against direct actions.
At the time of the accident in the Marchlik case,
the last
sentence of Section 260.11 (1) of the Wisconsin statute had read:
. shall exist
"The right of direct action herein given .
whether the policy of insurance sued upon was issued or
delivered in the state of Wisconsin or not and whether or
not the policy or contract of insurance contains a provision
accident or
forbidding such direct action, provided ' the
24
injury occurred in the state of Wisconsin."
22. Id.
23. Mutual Service Casualty Co. v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Co. 25 II1. App.2d 429,
166 N.E.2d 316 (1960) ; Pohlman v. Universal Mutual Casualty Co. 12 Ill. App.2d 153, 138
N.E.2d 848 (1956).
24. WIS. STAT. § 260.11(1) prior to the 1967 amendments.
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Subsequently, this sentence was deleted and the following provision
substituted therefor:
"If the policy of insurance was issued or delivered outside
the state of Wisconsin, the insurer is by this section-made
a proper party defendant only if '25
the accident or injury occurred in the state of Wisconsin.
This amendment alone should not affect the courts' decisions respecting subsequent cases where similar factual situations prevail.
In Lieberthal v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 26 the Michigan Supreme Court held that when a Michigan resident was injured in
an automobile accident in Wisconsin, a suit based upon the
Wisconsin statute against the insurer would not lie in Michigan
as it was against public policy since, by statute, direct actions
against insurers were prohibited. Thus the court said that it did
not have to decide whether the Wisconsin act was procedural or
substantive.
In an earlier decision, Kertson v. Johnson,27 Minnesota did permit a suit in Minnesota to be brought on the Wisconsin direct action
statute where the accident occurred in Wisconsin; but the decision
specifically pointed out that the policy was not before the court
so the court could not determine whether it contained a "no action"
clause or not. Assuming that the policy did not contain such a
clause the court determined that on the record suit would lie by
reason of the policy, not because of the Wisconsin procedure.
This decision is somewhat weakened by a subsequent holding of
the same court in Anderson v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins.
Co., 28 where the insurer established a "no action" clause in a
case where the injury occurred in Wisconsin and involved a policy
issued in that state. The court held that since Wisconsin had considered its statute procedural (respecting joinder of the insurer),
it would follow that holding. It indicated, however, a willingness to
hold otherwise if the Wisconsin court had held the statute substantive.
The Louisiana direct action statute 29 is not limited to injuries
25.

26.
27.
28.
29.

WIS. STAT.

§

260.11(1)

(1967

Supp.)

316 Mich. 37, 24 N.W.2d 547 (1946).
185 Minn. 591, 242 N.W. 329 (1932).
222 Minn. 428, 24 N.W.2d 836 (1946).
LA. REV. STAT. 22:655 reads in part:
.... the injured person or his or her survivors or heirs hereinabove referred
to, at their option, shall have a right of direct action against the insurer
within the terms and limits of the polioy; and such action may be brought
against the insurer alone, or against both the insured and insurer jointly and
in solido, in the parish In which the accident or injury occurred or in the
parish in which an action could be brought against either the insured or the
insurer under the general rules of venue prescribed by Art. 42, Code of Civil
Procedure. This right of direct action shall exist whether the policy of in-

surance sued upon was written or delivered in the State of Louisiana or not
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arising out of automobile accidents. However, it provides that the
accident or injury occur in Louisiana and that suit thereon against
the insurer be brought in the parish in which the accident or injury
occurred or in the parish in which an action could be brought
against either the insured or the insurer under the general rules
of venue prescribed by Article 42, Code of Civil Procedure. Notwithstanding the plain wording of the statute, three successful
attempts have been made to bring suit in another jurisdiction for
injuries which resulted from an accident in Louisiana. In Collins
v. American Automobile Insurance Co., 30 suit was brought in federal
district court in New York by a resident of Virginia (an incompetent
by his committee) against an insurer which was incorporated in
Missouri but which was doing business in New York, as well
as in Louisiana. The accident had occurred in Louisiana where
the policy was issued. The federal district court had dismissed the
action on the grounds of forum non conveniens but the circuit
court of appeals reversed, stating that the United States Supreme
Court had found that the Louisiana statute was substantive.3 1 The
court also indicated that New York, when confronted with the question, would apply the law of the forum and hold that the action
was substantive and not against the public policy for it pointed
out that New York practice permitted the impleader of insurers by
third-party plaintiffs and also provided that the insurer be named
in a compensation proceeding. This indicated a policy of permitting
insurers to be named in certain situations. With regard to the venue
provisions which required the suit to be brought in the parish
where the accident occurred, the circuit court of appeals found that
these were merely requirements of the place of suit which did
not carry beyond the limits of the Louisiana forum. This, the
court felt, followed logically from the decision in Lumbermen's
Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert.3 2 The court thereby overrode the
local venue requirements.
In Chambless v. National Industrial Laundries,33 the district
court held that the Louisiana law was substantive, having been so
and whether or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct
action, provided the accldent or Injury occurred within the State of Louisiana

....

It is also the intent of this Section that all liability policies within their
terms and limits are executed for the benefit of all injured persons, his or
her survivors or heirs, to whom the insured is liable; and that it is the purpose of all liability policies to give protection and coverage to all insureds,
whether they are named insured or additional insureds under the omnibus
clause, for any legal liability said insured may have as or for a tort-feasor
within the terms and limits of said policy.
30. 230 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1956).
31. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert 348 U.S. 48
Employers Liability Assurance Corp. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
32. 348 U.S. 48 (1954).
33. 149 F.Supp. 504 (E.D. Tex. 1957).

(1954);

Watson

v.
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held by the Louisiana Supreme Court itself,3 4 as well as by the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.3 5 There was no
showing that direct actions were against public policy in Texas,
the court stated, but such actions were previously not permitted
there because the Texas courts enforced the "no action" clauses
in the policies. In addition, the Collins 8 case had negated the venue
provisions by holding that the requirement that the suit be brought
in the parish where the injury occurred did not apply beyond the
state limits, and that since the action was transitory the state
could not limit the right of action to the extent that it be brought
only in the state of Louisiana.
In Shapiro v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company,37 suit was
by a Georgia resident injured in Louisiana against the insurer in
Georgia. Its motion to dismiss was denied, based on the fact that
the Louisiana act was substantive. Also, the court did not find
that the procedure conflicted with any ascertainable public policy
of Georgia since it found that the joinder of insurance carriers
was permitted in certain limited circumstances in Georgia.
A divided court in McArthur v. Indemnity Casualty Co. 38 held
that an action in Mississippi against the insurer of the truck which
had caused the injuries in Louisiana would not lie. Its decision
was based upon the fact that Louisiana, at that time, had determined
that its law was procedural and, therefore, comity did not require
that Mississippi follow it even though the court recognized that
it had the authority to determine whether a particular statute was
substantive or procedural. This holding was reaffirmed in Cook v.
State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 39 where, however, suit was under a
Mississippi policy but the accident had occurred in Louisiana.
The case of Pearson v. Globe Indemnity Company40 involved a
situation where the accident occurred in Louisiana, the plaintiff
was a resident of Mississippi, and the insured was a resident of
Louisiana. The federal court in Mississippi followed the Cook case
in holding that the Louisiana law did not have extraterritorial effect.
The court also stated that the Collins4 1 case was decided on the
assumption that the New York courts would "enforce" the Louisiana law and that the full faith and credit provisions of the Constitution did not require extraterritorial recognition of all statutes or
of any one statute under all circumstances. Lastly, the court
34. West v. Monroe Bakery 217 La. 189, 46 So.2d 122 (1950).
35. Fisher v. Home Indemnity Co., 198 F.2d 218, 221 (1952).
36. Collins v. American Automobile Insurance Co. of St. Louis, 230 F.2d 416 (2nd. Cir.
1956).
37. 234 F. Supp. 41 (N.D. Ga. 1963), Aff'd without opinion 337 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1964)
38. 184 Miss. 663, 186 So. 305 (1939).
39. 241 Miss. 371, 128 So.2d 363 (1961).
40. 311 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1962).
41. Supra note 37.
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noted that the parish venue provisions indicated that the Louisiana
statute was not intended to operate extraterritorially.
In Morton v. Maryland Casualty Company,4 2 contrary to the
prediction in the Collins case, the New York Court of Appeals
refused to grant extraterritorial effect to the Louisiana statute on
the ground that on the face of the statute, and by its wording and
arrangement, the limitation whereby suits may be brought in the
appropriate parishes only was inseparable from the cause of action
itself. The court stated further that its interpretation was strongly
supported by the Louisiana administrative practice which required
insurance carriers, as a condition precedent to doing business in
Louisiana, to sign a consent form in which they agreed to direct
suits "in the State of Louisiana." The court's decision was based
on the venue provisions only and did not reach the question as to
whether the direct action suit was against public policy. This decision, however, under the rules prevailing in diversity cases does,
in effect, foreclose future actions in the federal courts of New York
and to that extent nullifies the Collins case.
No cases have been found where attempts have been made to
43
secure extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Rhode Island statute.
However, the necessity for a non est inventus return seems to preclude its application in other states and indicates that the statute
was procedural. The statute is not limited to automobile cases.
The fact that the courts have held, however, that the policy must
be a Rhode Island contract 44 would not, in and of itself, seem to
preclude extraterritorial application following the interpretation
placed upon the Wisconsin and Louisiana statutes.
The direct action statute of Puerto Rico 45 at the time the New
42.
43.

4 N.Y.2d 488, 176 N.Y.S.2d 329, 151 N.E.2d 881 (1958).
R.I. GEN. LAWS Tit 27, Ch. 7, § (1) :
Every policy hereafter written insuring against liability for property
damage or personal injuries or both, and every policy hereinafter written indemnifying any person by reason of sudh liability . . . shall contain provisions to the effect that the insurer shall be directly liable to the injured party
and, in the event of his death, to the party entitled to sue therefor, to pay
him the amount of damages for which such insured is liable.
Sec. II: Such injured party, or, in the event of his death,.the party entitled to sue therefor, in his suit against the insured, shall not join the insurer
as a defendant. If, however, the officer serving any process against the insured shall return said process "non est inventus," the said injured party, and
in the event of his death, the party entitled to sue therefor, may proceed directly against the insurer. Said injured party, or, in the event of his death,
the party entitled to sue therefor, after having obtained judgment against
the insured alone, may proceed on said judgment in a separate action against
said insurer; provided, however, that payment in whole or in part of such
liability by either the insured or the insurer shall, to the extent thereof, be
a bar to recovery against the other of the amount so paid.
44. Riding v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 138 A. 186 (R. I. 1927) ; Coderre v. Travelers Ins. Co.
136 A. 305 (R.I. 1927).
45.

LAWS OF PUERTO

Rico Tit. 26

Sec. 2001.
The insurer issuing a policy insuring any person against loss or damage
through legal liability for the bodily Injury, death, or damage to properts, of
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York Court of Appeals decided the Oltarsh case" did not contain
the second sentence now found in Section 2003(1) of the Puerto
Rican statute which reads as follows:
"The direct action against the insurer may only be exercised in Puerto Rico."
This proviso was added by amendment effective May 26, 1966. In
Oitarsh, there was an action brought in New York for injuries
received by the plaintiff's wife and by her husband for loss of services and medical expenses incurred, resulting from a fall in a
building owned by a Puerto Rican corporation due, it was claimed,
solely to the latter's negligence. Suit was against the defendant,
Aetna Insurance Company, alone, which carrier was incorporated
in Connecticut and was doing business in Puerto Rico and in New
York. The policy sued upon was issued and delivered in Puerto
Rico. The defendant insurer's motion to dismiss was granted at a
special term, the court holding that it was against the public policy
of New York to bring a direct action against an insurer. This was
affirmed by the appellate division with leave to appeal to the
Court of Appeals. This court found, however, that the action would
lie, that the statute was substantive, and that the statute would
be applied in New York unless against the public policy of New
York as contended by the insurer. The court pointed out, however, that its rule precluding the disclosure of insurance had never
been absolute, but such references were condemned only where
the fact of insurance was irrelevant to the issue and where such
reference would in all likelihood be made for the purpose of improperly influencing the jury. It thus found that the plaintiff was
not barred by public policy in New York from suing the insurer
directly. The defendant's argument that Puerto Rico intended that

46.

a third person, shall become absolutely liable whenever a loss covered by the
Policy ocdurs, and payment of such loss by the insurer to the extent of its
liability therefor under the policy shall not depend upon payment by the insured of or upon any final judgment against him axising out of such occurrence.
Sec. 2003 (1):
Any individual sustaining damages and losses shall have, at his option,
a direct action against the insurer under the terms and limitations of the
policy, which action he may exercise against the insurer only or against the
insurer and the insured jointly. The direct action against the insurer may only
be exercised in Puerto Rico. The liability of the insurer shall not exceed that
provided for in the policy, and the court shall determine, not only the liability
of the insurer, but also the amount of the loss. Any action brought under this
section shall be subject to the conditions of the policy or contract and to the
defenses that may be pleaded by the insurer to the direct action instituted by
the insured.
(2)
If the plaintiff in such action brings suit against the insured alone,
such shall not be deemed to deprive him of the right, by subrogation, to the
rights of the insured under the policy, to maintain action against and recover
from the insurer after securing final judgment against the insured.
Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d 111, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577, 204 N.E.2d 622 (1965).
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its direct action statute be enforced solely by suits in its own courts
was rejected by the court when it pointed out the difference between
the Puerto Rican statute and the Louisiana statute which contained
a built-in venue provision. There was no such clause localizing suits
in Puerto Rico. However, the amendment above-mentioned now
would seem to give substance to this contention of the defendant.
In Rosenberg v. El San Juan Hotel Corp.,4 7 the alleged injury
occurred in Puerto Rico on December 31, 1965, to a resident of
New York. Action was started on August 1, 1966, in the Civil Court
in New York against both the insured and the insurer. Thus, between
the date of injury and commencement of the suit, the amendment to the Puerto Rican statute was enacted and became effective. The insurer's motion to dismiss was denied, the court holding
(following Oltarsh) that suit was not against the public policy of
New York and that under the Puerto Rican statute as it read at
the time of the injury, a substantive right was given which could
not be taken away from an injured person after it already had
accrued. The court further held that the direct action statute, as
amended, was prospective in nature and thus only affected those
actions which arose after the amendment to the statute.
In the case of Aponte v. American Surety Company of New
York, 48 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held
that the direct action statute of Puerto Rico was substantive and
thus would be applied in suits brought in the federal courts in
Puerto Rico or in suits removed to the federal courts under diversity jurisdiction. It should be noted that the Puerto Rican statute
is silent as to where a person must be injured, unlike the Louisiana
statute. The Puerto Rican statute is also silent as to where the
policy must be issued, contrary to both the Wisconsin and Louisiana
statutes. Nonetheless, it would seem that the legislative intent is
to limit its direct action statute to Puerto Rico as the amendment
so clearly provides.
Suits naming the insurer as the real party in interest.
Although the courts have recognized that the nominal defendants are the insureds, they have stated that the real parties in
interest are the insurers. In Dobkin v. Chapman,4 9 the court said:
"These [insurance company and the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation], rather than the named
defendants, are the real parties in interest in all but form." 50
47.
48.
49.
50.

53 Misc.2d 458, 278 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (Civ Ct. of City of New York 1967).
276 F.2d 678 (1st Cir. 1960').
21 N.Y.2d 490, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1968).
Id. at 504-505, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
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In the Simpson5

case, Justice Fuld stated:

"Viewed realistically, the insurer in a case such as
present is in full control of the litigation; it selects
defendant's attorneys; it decides if and when to settle;
it makes ' 52
all procedural decisions in connection with
litigation.
In his separately concurring opinion in the
Keating's statement is to the same effect:

the
the
and
the

same case, Judge

"Although no direct action statute is presently in effect,
I see no policy reason for not holding that service of process
on the real party defendant-the insurer-is sufficient to
compel it to defend in this State, provided it transacts business here
and is thus subject to the jurisdiction of our
5
courts." 3
In 1966, the Florida Bar petitioned the Florida Supreme Court
for an additional rule governing the conduct of attorneys which
would have precluded a lawyer who was employed by a lay agency,
personal or corporate, including insurance companies, from rendering legal services in the scope of his employment to or for persons
other than his employer. Briefs were filed in support of and against
the petition for the new rule. In the brief filed by the attorneys
representing the insurance industry, admissions 'as to the "direct
financial interest" of the insurers and the fact that there is an
"identity and community of interest in the defense of any suit
brought against the insured" was noted. This language was seized
upon by the court in Bussey v. Shingleton54 as some evidence
admissible to the jury on the question as to whether the insurer
was the real party in interest and thus under the rules of civil
procedure55 could be joined with the insured as a party defendant.
The case involved an automobile accident and the injured plaintiff
named both the insured and her insurer as parties defendant. The
complaint alleged that the policy insured defendant Shingleton
against liability because of bodily injuries sustained due to the
operation of the automobile. The policy was written in favor of third
persons who might suffer damages by virtue of the operation of
the automobile. By reason thereof, the moment the accident occurred
the insurance policy enured to the benefit of the plaintiff. The policy
involved was stipulated to be a liability policy and not an indemnity
policy. The circuit court struck those portions of the complaint
51. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
52. Id at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
53. Id. at 313, 234 N.E.2d at 673, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
54. 211 So.2d 593 (1968), affd. Fla. S. Ct.
155. Fed R. Civ. P. 1.210(a).
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joining the insurer as a party defendant and dismissed the insurer
as a party to the action. The district court of appeals recognized
that, based on previous decisions, such action was correct, but felt
that it was time for a new look to be taken into the question. The
court felt this way because of events happening subsequent to the
previous decisions and subsequent legislative enactments, as well
as changes in public policy. It outlined the various reasons theretofore given for nonjoinder such as the misjoinder of a tort and contract
action, lack of privity between the insurer and the plaintiff, and
the proviso that if insurance were made known it would be prejudicial. After quoting a rule of procedure as to parties, the court
reemphasized that the rule provided:
who has or claims
any person may be a defendant
"...
' 56
an interest adverse to the plaintiff.
It then stated that the admissions made by insurance counsel,
which the court admitted did not have the force of precedent law,
should be very persuasive in determining that the insurer is the
real party in interest and "has or claims an interest adverse to
the plaintiff ' 5 7 and that these briefs constituted an admissible type
of evidence which should be heard by the jury. The court also
pointed out that the company, by reason of the policy, reserved
the right to control litigation and obligated itself to defend such
litigation. The court said:
We feel that today there is a difference in the insurance
required, calling for a different view from that heretofore,
held by our courts. We feel it is time that our courts adopt
a construction of the Rule to conform to that which is necessary to see the carrying out of justice. We must remember,
there is no statutory law prohibiting the making of the
insurer a defendant. It is case law and we may by case law
change the rule to mete out justice. Such liability policies,
as the one in this case is admitted to be, in view of the mandatory statutorial requirements for liability insurance in
minimum specified amounts, and the demand therefor by
public policy, and the injection of the insurance company
as an interested party, by the policy itself, we think should
be construed as quasi-third party beneficiary contracts,
thereby giving the injured third party an unquestionable
right to join such maker of such insurance policy as a party
defendant. This may be accomplished by a legislative act,
but can be accomplished by what we believe to be a proper
construction of Rule 1.210 (a), F.R.C.P. to include as a party
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
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defendant just those whom the Rule says: "Any person
who has or claims an interest adverse to the plaintiff."
If the insurance company is defending in behalf of itself
and its insured, then there can be no question that said
insurance company has an interest in the law suit, nor
can there be any question but that such interest is adverse
to that of the plaintiff. 58
The court further commented:
"So, either the insurance company attorney is guilty of
violating the Canons of Ethics (which we do not think to
be so) or their real clients, the insurance companies, are
real parties in interest and should properly be made parties
defendant to the action."5 9
In the case of Crable v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, Ethel
Skrowonski,60 the court by a decision dated January 20, 1969, dismissed the action against the insurance company on two grounds:
(1) based on Podolsky v. Devinney61 the in rem proceeding against
the insurer was improper and (2) although service on the insurer
was valid, the complaint did not state a cause of action. The court
said:
An automobile liability insurer may be made a party to a
suit against its insured, Bussey v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 211 So. 2d 593. A direct action against
the said insurer is not permissible in the absence of the presence of the insured as a party. Since service of process has
not been obtained over the person of the insured, Ethel
Skrowonski, the amended complaint does not state a cause
of action62 against the insurer, Employers Insurance of
Wausau.
Thus, this court recognized that a direct action would lie, according
to Florida law, but required that the insured be joined as a necessary party defendant. It should be pointed out that the same
plaintiff sued the same parties in Illinois under the same theories.
The court dismissed that action based upon the Marchlik 3 decision.
In rem actions used to secure jurisdiction over the defendant.
Several recent cases in New York, both in the federal district
courts of New York and the state courts have caused considerable
discussion in the insurance industry and by legal commentators.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Bussey v. Shingleton, 211 So.2d 593, 596-597 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
Id. at 597.
Case No. 68-1181 (Civil PI.C. Fla. Dist. Ct. 1969).
281 F.Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Supra, note 60.
Supra, note 2.
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While not strictly within the scope of this article since the insurer
is not a named defendant, the fact that an action in rem is brought
against the insurer has the practical effect of a direct action up
to the policy limits. As a matter of fact, in his dissenting opinion in
Seider v. Roth,6 4 Judge Burke said:
"To base jurisdiction on the mere existence of an automobile
liability policy, even though the promises in it are not yet
due, is to allow a direct action against the insurer."6 5
Further, in Podolsky v. Devinney,66 Judge Croake said:
"Implicit in both of these objections to jurisdiction is the
contention that New York in effect has established a direct
action without significant minimum contacts or without adequate procedural safeguards." 67
In Fishman v. Sanders,6 the accident occurred in New York
but the plaintiff was unable to secure either personal service or
service under Section 52 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (Vehicle
and Traffic Law, Section 254) on the defendant. The plaintiff secured
a warrant of attachment on the "contractual obligation or liability
contained or represented by" the automobile policy of insurance
issued by the Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company, the
defendant's insurer. The respondent insurance company's motion to
vacate the levy of attachment was on two grounds: (1) that it
was void pursuant to Subdivision 2 of Section 922 of the Civil
Practice Act, since more than 90 days had expired since the making
of the levy and the sheriff had not taken actual custody of the policy
of insurance, and (2) that the insured's interest in the policy was
purely contingent and not attachable. The special term granted a
motion to vacate the levy on the second ground, finding it unnecessary, therefore, to pass upon the first contention. On appeal, the
appellate division found that there had been no compliance with
Section 922 and affirmed. In doing so, however, it said:
"It is our opinion that the respondent's contractual obligation to defend and indemnify defendant is a debt or cause
of action capable of being attached within the purview of
Section 916 of the Civil Practice Act. (Matter of Riggle,
11 A.D. 2d 51, 205 N.Y.S. 2d 19, aff'd 11 N.Y. 2d 73, 226
N.Y.S. 2d 416, 181 N.E. 2d 436 cf Grand Union v. General
Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, 254 App.
64. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966).
65. Id. at 117, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 104, 216 N.E.2d at 316.
66. Supra, note 62.
67,. Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
68. 18 App. Div.2d 689, 235 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1962) rev'd on other grounds 15 N.Y.2d 298,
258 N.Y.S.2d 380, 206 N.E.2d 326 (1965).
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Div. 274, 4 N.Y.S. 2d 704, affirmed 279 N.Y. 638, 18 N.Y.
2d 38; Baumgold Brothers v. Schwarzchild Brothers, 276
App. Div. 158, 93 N.Y.S 2d 658, affirmed 302 N.Y. 628,

97 N.E. 2d 357.)69
Concurring in the result, Justice Beldock said:
"In my opinion, only the insurer's obligation to defend is
attachable because only that obligation arose absolutely on
the happening of the accident. The obligation to indemnify
is not attachable because indemnification is contingent upon
an ultimate adjudication of the defendant's liability to the

plaintiffs.'

'70

Since the attachment had been vacated because of failure to comply
with the statutory procedure, these statements are in the nature
of dicta and were captioned as such by Judge Ughetta in his dissenting opinion in Seider v. Roth.71
In the Seider 72 case, the two plaintiffs, husband and wife, residents of New York, were injured in an automobile accident in Vermont claimed to be due to the negligence of the defendant, Lemiux,
who lived in Quebec, Canada. The defendant was insured by the
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Corporation under an automobile
policy which was issued to him in Canada. The order of attachment
directed the sheriff in New York to levy upon the contractual obligation of Hartford to defend and to indemnify defendant Lemiux
under the policy of automobile liability insurance issued to Lemiux
by Hartford. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to vacate
the warrant of attachment and the service of summons and complaint upon him, which action was affirmed by the appellate division (one justice dissenting) citing the Fishman case as an authority
for their action. Justice Ughetta dissented and pointed out that
their statement in Fishman was erroneous dicta and the insurer's
obligation was not attachable because it was not a debt absolutely
payable, and nothing was owed under the policy, at least until
the plaintiffs recovered a judgment. Also, there was not an absolute
obligation to defend as of the time of the accident. This duty to
defend came into being when it appeared from the allegations in
the negligence action that the injury arose within the coverage
of the policy. In a four to three decision the Court of Appeals affirmed, citing as authority Riggle 3 and decisions from Massa69. Fishman v. Sanders, 18 App. Div.2d 689, 235 N.Y.S.2d 861, 862 (1962).
70. Id. at 863.
71. 23 App. Div.2d 787, 258 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1965), aff'd. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99,
216 N.E.2d 312 (1966).
72 Id.
73. In re Riggle's Estate, 11,N.Y.2d 73, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416, 181 N.E.2d 436 (1962).
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chusetts, 74 Illinois,7 5 and New Hampshire .67 Judge Desmond, speaking for the majority, said:
The whole question, therefore, is whether [the insurer's]
contractual obligation to defendant is a debt or cause of
action such as may be attached. The ... policy is in customary form. It requires (the insurer), among other things, to
defend [the insured] in any automobile negligence action
and if judgment be rendered against [the insured], to indemnify him therefore. Thus, as soon as the accident occurred
there was imposed on [the insurer] a contractual obligation which should be considered a 'debt' within the meaning of CPLR 5201 and 6202... .77 It is said that by affirmance
here we would be setting up a "direct action" against the insurer. This is true to the extent only that affirmance will
put jurisdiction in New York State and require the insurer
to defend here, not because a debt owing by it to the defendant has been attached but because by its policy it has agreed
to defend in any place where jurisdiction is obtained against
its insured. 7s
In his dissenting opinion (concurred in by two other judges), Judge
Burke could find no debt that was attachable and said:
The so-called 'debt' which is supposed to be subject to attachment is a mere promise made to the nonresident insured by the foreign insurance carrier to defend and indemnify the Canadian resident if a suit is commenced and if
damages are awarded against the insured. Such a promise is
contingent in nature. It is exactly this type of contingent undertaking which does not fall within the definition of attachable debt contained in CPLR 5201, subd. [a], i.e., one which
'is past due or which is yet to become due, certainly or upon
demand of the judgment debtor.' The bare undertaking to
defend and indemnify is not an obligation 'past due' and it
is not certain to become due until jurisdiction over the
74. Gordon v. Shea, 300 Mass. 95, 14 N.E.2d 105 (1938).
75., Furst v. Brady, 375 I. 425, 31 N.E.2d 606, 133 A.L.R. 558 (1941).
76. Robinson v. Carroll, 87 N.H. 114, 174 A. 773, 94 A.L.R. 1437 (1934).
77. New York Civil Practice Law and Rules 5201(a) Debt against which a money
judgment may be enforced.
A money judgment may be enforced against any debt, which Is past due or
which is yet to become due, certainly or upon demand of the judgment debtor,
whether it was incurred within or without the state, to or frobi a resident
or non-resident, unless it Is exempt from apli[lcation to the satisfaotion of
the judgment. A debt may consist of a cause of action which could be assigned or transferred accruing within or without the state.
(b)
Property against which a money judgment may be enforced.
A money judgment may be enforced against any property which could be
assigned or transferred, whether it consists of a present or future right or
interest and whether or not It is vested, unless it is exempt from application to the satisfaction of the judgment . . .
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules 6202. Debt or property subject to
attachment. Proper garnishee. "Any debt or property against which a money
judgment may be enforced as provided in section 5201 is subject to attachment ....
78. Seider v. Roth 17 N.Y.2d 111, 113-114, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 101-102 (1966).
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insured is properly obtained. In New York, 'It is well settled
that an indebtedness is not attachable unless it is absolutely
payable at present, or 79 in the future and not dependable
upon any contingency.'
Thus there was a sharp conflict in the court as to the nature of
the insurance policy and whether it was attachable as a "debt"
within the act in order to confer jurisdiction in rem as respects the
policy's nonresident insured.
The court was asked to reconsider its decision in Simpson v.
Loehmann 0 and for the first time the constitutionality of the procedure was placed in issue. In this case, on August 13, 1961, the
infant plaintiff, a resident of New York was injured when cut by
a boat propeller owned by the defendant, a Connecticut resident,
off the waters of Madison, Connecticut. Suit was brought in New
York but the plaintiffs were unable to obtain personal jurisdiction.
They thus had the summons and complaint delivered to the defendant in Connecticut and attached a liability policy issued to the
defendant in Connecticut by an insurance company, a Pennsylvania
corporation but doing business in New York and having an office
in the City of New York.
On motion to vacate the attachment on jurisdictional and constitutional grounds, the court specifically held that the procedure
did not offend against due process and then said:
It is, of course, hardly necessary to add that neither the
Seider decision nor the present one purports to expand
the basis for in personam jurisdiction in view of the fact
that the recovery is necessarily limited to the value of the
asset attached, that is, the liability insurance policy. For
the purpose of pending litigation, which looks to an ultimate
judgment and recovery, such value is its face amount and
not some abstract or hypothetical value.8
The vote was five to two, with four different opinions. The chief
judge's opinion was concurred in by one judge. Judge Keating
wrote a separately concurring opinion, as did Judge Breitel. However, Judge Breitel, a new judge, concurred with the other three
only upon the principle of stare decisis, for he said:
Only a major reappraisal by the court,
rather than the
accident of a change in its composition, would justify the
overruling of that precedent. Yet the theoretical unsoundness
of the Seider case and the undesirable practical consequences
79.
80,.
81.

Id. at 115, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
21 N.Y.2d 305, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 234 NE.2d 669 (1967).
Id. at 310, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 636-63'7
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of its rule require some comment if only, perhaps, to hasten
the day of its overruling or its annulment by legislation. 2
There were two dissenting judges. Thus four out of the seven, a
majority, questioned the soundness of the Seider rule.
In the interim, in Podolsky v. Devinney 3 the federal district
court refused to follow the Simpson case. In Podolsky, the accident
occurred on May 8, 1966, when the plaintiff, a New York resident,
was injured as the result of an intersection automobile collision in
New Jersey with an automobile owned by and driven by New Jersey
residents. The automobile was insured by a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of Great Britain but authorized to do
business in New Jersey, New York, and other states in the United
States. Action was started in New York state court by attachment
of the insurance policy. The case was removed on the grounds of
diversity to the federal district court where a motion to vacate the
attachment was made. The constitutionality of Seider was also challenged. The court held that the New York attachment procedure
violated the Fourteenth Amendment because the New York statute 4
did not allow the insured to make a special appearance and to defend
on the merits without subjecting himself to in personam jurisdiction
and to the possibility of suffering a judgment over the policy limits.
Also, with respect to the insurer, if the insured defaulted, the insurer would become liable up to the policy limits without being
afforded an opportunity to litigate the issue of liability, thereby
depriving the insurer of property without due process.
85
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals in Simpson v. Loehmann,
in a per curiam opinion, denied a motion for reargument stating:

Further, the appellant's argument based on the impact of
CPLR 320 (subd. [c]), also asserted for the first time,
fails to take account of the explicit statement in the court's
opinion . . . that 'neither the Seider decision . . . nor the
present one purports to expand the basis for in personam
jurisdiction in view of the fact that the recovery is necessarily limited to the value of the asset attached, that is, the
liability insurance policy. For the purpose of pending litiga82.
83.
84

85.

Id. at 314, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
.New York Civil Practice Law and Rules 320(c) as amended 1965.
When appearance confers personal jurisdiction, in certain cases. In a case ...
where the court's jurisdlction is not based upon personal service on the defendant, an appearance is not equivalent to personal service of the summons
upon the defendant if an objection to jurisdiction under paragraphs eight or
nine of subdivision (a) of rule 3211, or both, is asserted by motion or in the
answer, as provided in Rule 3211, unless the defendant proceeds with the defense after asserting the objection to jurisdiction and the objection is not
ultimately sustained.
21 N.Y.2d 990, (Case 2), 238 N.E, Z 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (App. Div. 1968).
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tion, which looks to an ultimate judgment and recovery, such
value is its face amount and not some abstract or hypothetical value.' This, it is hardly necessary to add, means
that there may not be any recovery against the defendant
in this sort of case in an amount greater than the face value
of such insurance policy even though he proceeds with the
defense on the merits.8A
Thus, the court is allowing a limited appearance notwithstanding
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules 320, Subdivision (c), in the
Seider-type cases. Since the recovery is limited to the face value
of the policy, it is submitted that there is no material difference
between a direct action where, by statute, the insurer's liability
is limited to the face of the policy and where an action in rem
is permitted under the Seider-type case.
Where the plaintiff was not a resident of New York, the court
in Vaage v. Lewis8 " reversed the trial court which had refused
to dismiss an action by a resident of Norway who was injured
in an accident in North Carolina and who had obtained in rem
jurisdiction over the insurer by attachment of the insurance policy.
The appellate division felt that where the only contact with New
York was that the insurer did business there, the case should have
been dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens. The court
pointed out that a close reading of Seider and Simpson indicated
that New York residency was a crucial consideration even though
residency does not bear directly on the court's power or juris-,
diction over a defendant in an in rem action. The res is the jurisdictional fulcrum. The court said:
We are obliged under the circumstances of this case, where
no special considerations are advanced, to dwell on the aptness of the forum non conveniens doctrine. Essentially, it is
the convenience of our courts, not that of the litigants, and
the practical ramifications which determine the acceptance
or rejection of the doctrine in a particular case [citing
cases] . . . For this compelling reason, and also because we
believe that an exercise of jurisdiction in this case would
deprive the defendants of basic due process (Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 ;see
Lefcourt v. Sea Crest Hotel & Motor Inn, 54 Misc. 2d 376,
282 N.Y.S. 2d 896), the order should be reversed, on the
Law, without costs, and the defendants' motion granted. 88
There are many practical difficulties raised by these decisions
89
which remain for future cases to decide.
86.
87.
88.
89.
Rules

rd. at 915-916, 290 N.Y.S.2d.
29 App. Div.2d 315, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1968).
Id. at 524-525.
Siegel, Supplementary Practice Commentary to New York Civil Practice Law and
(CPLR) § 5201, Book 7B, 1968-69 Pocket Part.

504

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

How general this practice is of obtaining jurisdiction in rem
by attachment of the insurance policy in New York is not known
to the writer. Published opinions of the two federal district court
cases, Barker v. Smith,90 Jarvik v. Magic Mountain Corporation,"'
and one state court case, Flemming v. Williams, 92 indicate that
use is being made of this procedure. The writer has no way of
knowing how many unreported cases there are. It is understood
that attempts to test the constitutionality of the Seider procedure
are being made in the United States Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the continued efforts being made to join the
insurance carriers as direct defendants, it would seem that the
insurance industry should not have too great a concern over any
further extra-territorial extension of the present direct action statutes. However, it is felt that the attempts being made to show that
the insurer is the real party in interest and thus joinable as a party
defendant and particularly the in rem procedures if adopted by
other states will present real problems that the industry must face.

90.
91.
92.

290 F. Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
290 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
293 N.Y.S.2d 45 (App. Div. 1968).

